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Abstract 
 How do Nordic states conduct policies in order to bring people closer 
to the socio-economic realm, in the sense that they, being social capital, tend 
to be integrated as active and participatory citizens? How do the 
interventionist and expensive Nordic welfare states survive in the global age, 
with demanding and ever changing claims to international competitiveness?  
This paper addresses these questions. Social capital and partnership building 
are introduced as terms and policy concepts in order to find answers in the 
framework of intended or unintended strategic endeavours. As a critical 
approach claims a contextual conceptualisation, we shall here view different 
European social models and administrative traditions in relation to 
comparative basic contexts in order to arrive at analytical answers. Leaning 
especially on the Anglo-Saxon model, the traditional Scandinavian universal 
welfare state model of the post-war Keynesian order has gradually been 
transformed into the contemporary Nordic model (Veggeland 2007). 
Contextual regulatory innovations and path-dependent processes have 
generated the survival of universal welfare state arrangements and collective 
action but with the mixed use of Market-Type Mechanisms (MTM) in the 
public sector of Anglo-Saxon origin. In summary, this blending of policies 
has resulted in the advantageous social capital of what is called flexicurity, 
social security combined with a flexible participatory labour market. We 
shall discuss both flexicurity policy and participatory subsidiarity defined 
downwards as contribution to an explanation of why the expensive welfare 
states of the Nordic type have not only so far been doing well but have also 
sustained both democratic and output-side legitimacy. 
 
Keywords: Administrative traditions, Nordic model, structural threats, 
subsidiarity 
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Social capital and innovation 
 The European Union (EU) is in a deep crisis of identity as many 
times earlier in its history. Again Europe is looking for ideas and concepts of 
social capital that might constitute and give the integrated global regions an 
impetus to more sustainable economic activity, employment, and welfare, 
through collective action and renewed endogenous development, both inside 
countries and across national borders (Cini (ed.) 2004, Hayward and Menon 
(eds.) 2003). Partnership-building that connects private and public actors as 
well as public actors to other public actors has the intention of strengthening 
existing social capital (Putnam 1993) and raising new social (and human) 
capital as strategic concepts for promoting economic renewal and sustainable 
welfare (Szreter and Woolcock 2004). The concepts draw upon the belief 
that pooling actors in micro or macro networks (clusters according to Porter 
1998) and organised ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and Thrift 1995a) in the 
form of collective action are basic policy strategies when the target of the 
polity is to achieve and increase competitive development capacity. The 
strategy goes for organising existing or new public and private actors for 
collective actions through contracts and partnership formations, both 
nationally and locally, as we know recommended by European development 
programmes. Additionally, partnership institutions fit into the mode of 
arm’s-length steering, which characterises the regulatory state (Keating 
1998). The beneficial outcome is the advantages that come with the building 
of extensive social capital. We may, however, view social capital as a 
diversified notion (Veggeland ed. 2016). 
 The concept of social capital came about in the James C. Coleman’s 
(Sørensen and Spilerman 1993)1 and Robert D. Putman’s (Putman (ed.) 
2002) version in the US in the 1980s. It was part of a major political change 
that took place in those years in the Anglo-Saxon US and the UK and had 
wide-ranging consequences. The neo-liberal economic discourse and NPM 
organisational changes entered the global scene. Social capital became an 
imperative economic notion. A critical expression became resonant: social 
capital, social but still capital (Navarro 2002, 2004). A past president of the 
American Political Science Association, Theodore Lowi, indicated that 
‘economic language is the dominant language in social science discourse 
today …… we are witnessing the de-politicization of politics’ (1992:86). In 
other words, it implies that social capital building has become a narrow 
concept based only on economic values. Contrary to this reductive notion, 
there also exists a wider concept of social capital that accounts for additional 
social and sustainable ethical values. 
                                                          
1 See Social theory and social policy: essays in honour of James S. Coleman / edited by 
Aage B. Sørensen and Seymour Spilerman. Westport, Connecticut; London Praeger. 
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 The term ‘social capital’ reflects not only the understanding that 
government needs capital but that individuals need capital in order to 
compete or survive better in the competitive and microeconomic world as 
well (Veggeland ed. 2016). As capital, investment in building social capital 
creates, therefore, expectations first and foremost of economic revenues 
derived from the social realm and expectations about business growth; if not 
these do not happen, the investment is deemed a failure. We may express this 
notion in the following way. Building social capital within this framework of 
economics tends to become an art of social and human engineering 
(Beetham et al. 2002, Moran 2003). The target of this art is the creation of 
competitive micro-partnership formations and joined-up initiatives, but such 
targets are often based on short-term market thinking and changes, and 
thereof the frequent shifting of partner alliances. 
 
Comparison of social models  
  Michael Moran’s thesis (2003) is that social capital in the sense of 
engineered micro-partnerships and institutional changes has been a ‘fiasco’ 
with the consequence of generating more innovation in an ever ascending, or 
more accurately, descending, spiral (Veggeland 2013). Moran argues that in 
the Anglo-Saxon UK, the last 30 years have been an era of ‘hyper-
innovation’, displaying ‘the frenetic selection of new institutional modes like 
partnerships and arm’s length bodies, and their equally frenetic replacement 
by alternatives’ (2003:26). Other scholars have supported this thesis (Scharpf 
1999, Veggeland 2004, ed. 2016, Higdem 2007). It might have caused the 
Brexit from the EU. 
 The implication of Moran’s thesis is that partnership-building of this 
kind encourages collaborative governance and collective action at the micro-
level because of ‘spill-over’ effects. It becomes a strategy for taming 
fragmentation, inefficiency, and increasing transactional costs. Further, its 
unexpected ‘spill-over’ effects will manifest as unpredictable actions and 
sudden dilutions of partnerships, which demand replacements. Individualised 
interest conflicts and social inequality among the partners devastate 
partnerships and cause the ‘frenetic replacement by alternatives’. Increasing 
transactional costs becomes another threat because of this ‘ascending, or 
descending, innovation spiral’. We should, however, understand this 
properly. Of course, the partnership concept as collective action and social 
capital of the engineered, economically valued variety also, in general, 
encourages good governance. Theodore Lowi and Vincent Navarro have, 
however, identified the problem: the narrow and economically valued 
concept of social capital does not only lead to the de-politicisation of politics 
but may contextually, depending on social models, be a barrier for building 
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wider-valued social capital at the societal macro-level. With this in mind, let 
us study some lessons from Scandinavia. 
 With regard to the prospect of good governance within the 
framework of national macro-partnership for collective action, for example, 
Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock (2004) have concluded that the 
Swedish welfare state provides social capital of the wider-valued type to its 
citizens in a better way and more innovatively than do other social models. 
How have these scholars supported such a statement? Let us test their 
suggestion in a wider Nordic framework. 
 Taking Szreter and Woolcock’s statement seriously, we must say that 
they made such an assertion based on a consideration of what is good or 
deficient social capital. In other words, they must have drawn the conclusion 
on the grounds of preferable Swedish welfare norms, social ethics, and 
valued results, which the actual social model fulfils. They conclude 
indirectly that social science should be able to say whether or not social 
capital building has led to ‘successes’ along a scale of goal achievement. It 
means we need criteria against which to assess and measure success or 
failure. Neither Szreter and Woolcock nor Moran with his ‘fiasco’ statement 
indicates such criteria. Actually, reviewing the issue of ‘good-bad’ 
governance critically from a normative point of view is all too rarely done 
(Black 2005). 
 What we do know though is that social models and administrative 
traditions, which naturally have come into being in a socio-economic 
framework of values and experiences, do influence the quality and practical 
outcome of institutional change (Veggeland 2013, Pedersen 2008, March and 
Olsen 1989), and consequently also the formation of partnership and the 
provision of social capital. Let us review the Swedish case a little further. 
Szreter and Woolcock’s observations warrant a serious consideration of the 
Swedish welfare-state model as a major point of reference in order to 
determine macro social capital in a wider normative framework than the 
instrumental approach to the concept often does.  
 In what follows, we shall take that approach, but we shall view the 
Swedish model within the framework of the major Scandinavian-Nordic 
model, in which the former model represents the core (Veggeland 2007). 
Szreter and Woolcock refer to ‘other societies’ in their statement but do not 
point out which ones. Here we shall address this oversight by making a 
comparison of macro social capital formation and policy belonging to the 
Nordic model and its constituent countries, which are thought influenced 
normatively with social-capital policy from the Anglo-Saxon model and the 
Continental model. Regarding the former model, the focus will be on the 
social-democratic tradition responsible for the promotion of social capital 
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based on universal welfare and social security, an active labour-market 
policy, and an interventionist and comparatively expensive state. 
 Contemporary focus on the building of social capital through various 
partnership formations is a key part of the debate on both ‘reinventing 
government’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) and ‘rediscovering institutions’ 
(March and Olsen 1989). As such, the focus reflects the pandemic search for 
ideas of institutional change and innovation in the global age (Cassese 2003). 
However, the search for and the adoption of ideas do not happen randomly 
but are linked to contextual ‘interpretation’ of values and substance (Røvik 
2007).  Accordingly, this implies that social models and administrative 
traditions affect the interpretation of concepts of social capital and their 
attendant policy, which results in diversified implementation (Veggeland 
2007).  
Table1. The deviant Nordic model: Public outlays, taxes, and employment in the context of 
European social models. 
Indicators:     Social models: 
        Anglo-Saxon* Nordic**  Continental*** 
 
Government outlays as           43-45 %      482-58 %   47-54 % 
% of nominal GDP 
Taxes as % of GDP (2009) 31-37 %     45-51 %    42-46 % 
Unemployment rates (2010) 4.4-4.7       5.4-8.83      9.5-9.7 
*Represented by Ireland and UK,  ** The five Nordic countries, *** Represented by France and 
Germany.                                    (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,           OECD data 2005 
                Norway, Sweden) 
 
 With references to the issue of reinventing government and the 
debate on public innovation and its framework, the term and concept of 
social capital is related to this debate and reviewed in its framework. 
 In a comparative perspective, there are a number of ways to 
demonstrate the deviant position of the Nordic-model countries. One way is 
to look at the size of the public sector measured as general, total 
governmental outlays as a percentage of the nominal GDP and as total taxes 
as a percentage of the GDP (Table 1). This indicates the degree to which 
governments and countries’ citizens are willing to spend money on collective 
rather than individual goods in society. Welfare and social security issues are 
part of the collective approach. It is a historical fact that this willingness is 
lowest in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and highest in the Nordic tradition but 
with the Continental tradition close up to in substance. This is not so strange 
when we account for the historical roots and framework of the Scandinavian 
welfare-state model having its origins in the Prussian collective thinking of 
                                                          
2 Finland’s 48 per cent makes an acceptance because of lasting repercussions after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
3 Finland 8.8 per cent, see previous footnote explanation. 
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the late nineteenth century and the performance of the Weberian neutral 
bureaucracy (Kuhnle 2000). The unemployment rate is on a low level (even 
lower in 2007 3-5 per cent) but slightly higher than what the Anglo-Saxon 
model provides. The question is what legitimates a high tax level among 
people, and what role does social capital play regarding the social-model 
figures presented in Tab.1? 
 
Innovative Action and structural change 
 Social constructions, like engineered partnership as social capital, are 
precarious, tending to erode and dissolve over time, especially when short-
term economic revenues are expected (Veggeland 2003). These aspects 
concern the survival of social models and administrative traditions. In 
contrast, building long-term social capital presupposes basically the 
existence of values found in local networks, identity, mutual consent, social 
equality, and community life, besides public and private funding access. 
Some social models may be good fits for these values and comparatively 
better than others (Iversen 2005, Knill 2001). Accordingly, these social 
models tend to benefit from administrative traditions that contribute to social 
equality, universal welfare, and social security (Veggeland 2007), in addition 
to the stable networking of local and regional communities. Robert D. 
Putnam (1993) has stressed the latter in his study of the developmental 
success in Northern Italian communities in the 1980s. Tight collective 
networking communities provided long-term, ‘great’ social capital 
(Veggeland 2013). 
 In our knowledge-based economy, we are constantly looking for 
networking partnership and collaborative governance principles, i.e., models 
of collective action. This search aims to find outstanding and innovative 
policy ideas that organise those socio-economic bodies that make 
collaborative developments work. Network bodies should involve the public 
sector and private partners in innovative clusters across all sectors and areas 
of the polity, among others, Michael Porter says (2000). 
 As such, we find public innovation measured in the context of a 
geographical area (state, regions of different scale), or a particular policy 
domain (welfare, labour market, environment), or some other unit of analysis 
(an organisation, individual), or some combination of the two (social 
regulation or labour marked in Scandinavia) (see, for example, Pedersen 
2008). Actually, public innovation is about intervention and co-ordination of 
joint activities aimed at social capital through network and partnership 
formations by territory, by function or even by transcending national and 
transnational policies. Public innovation defines in the knowledge-based 
society the building and performance of new accountable and beneficial 
collective skills and knowledge capabilities, through social as well as human 
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capital, and through fixed strategic processes in order to achieve and realise 
this capability (Warden, F. van 1995).  
 Accordingly, public innovation in networks and matters of strategic 
policy imply, on the one hand, transcending fiscal and regulatory 
interventions and the territorial and functional creation of new organisations 
like partnerships, either as public-private or public-public partnerships. On 
the other hand, such innovations also dispose change in norms, rules, 
standards, and operating procedures; these changes influence the 
conceptualisation of the reform processes. Basically, path-dependence 
created by social models and an administrative tradition that makes the 
changes contextually impacted and deep-rooted circumscribes such 
interventions (Veggeland 2007, Pierson 2004). Simply put, public innovation 
means the use of new solutions to address old problems, or old solutions to 
address ‘new’ problems of development. Generally, we may see institutional 
innovation as the pursuit of the modern, all-embracing project of change with 
regard to rationalisation, systematisation, and ordering, but this change does 
not take place a political and ideological vacuum (Meyer 2000). 
 Yet, if all innovations are change, are all changes innovations? The 
latter, converse statement cannot be an appropriate and reasonable 
conclusion. We should approach network innovation contextually and view it 
as the application of new solutions to old problems, or new solutions to 
newly ‘constructed’ problems. This idea has inspired studies that have 
attempted to determine the criteria for differentiating superficial and short-
term policy changes from deep-rooted and long-term innovations. A 
typology of policy change is germane here. Three forms of changes are 
identified: 
• The first-order of change is instrumental, defining changes to the 
levels and settings of basic instruments like technology and budgetary 
restrain. Hall does not regard instrumental changes as innovative.  
• Second-order changes are those that refer to modifications in the use 
and administration of the instruments in relation to current organisational 
processes. But the art of engineering changes neither the overall goals of 
policy, norms, and values nor the understanding on which the changes are 
based. Because these second-based changes occur within existing social 
models and traditional frameworks of values and norms without disturbing 
them, they may serve to reinforce the path-dependence of the models. 
Paradoxically, they may counteract reformatory change and thereof deep-
rooted and long-term innovations. The instrumental concept of social capital 
represents such a second-based change, as we shall see below. 
• The third-order changes are transformations of the overall goals of 
the policy, changes in the cognitive and normative framework of the 
networking regulatory regime on which it is based, accompanied by first and 
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second-order changes. These changes might lead to deep-rooted and long-
term public innovations, for example, moves that remain path-dependent and 
also aspire to reinvent the state and to rediscover institutions in new settings 
but.  
 We shall see below that the traditional Scandinavian model of the 
welfare state has undergone such a move, and, as a result, has become known 
as the contemporary Nordic model. This model has combined universal 
social security and active labour-market policies innovatively, and this 
combination constitutes a deep-rooted and long-term, path-dependent social 
capital. This social capital may be objectively experienced by individuals 
and collectives and is suitable for studies that employ empirical, statistical 
measurements. Third-order social capital represents substantial public 
innovation.  
 
Social capital of the Nordic type. 
 In a transnational perspective, we may view social capital in the 
Nordic countries as a transformation of the traditional Scandinavian welfare-
state capacity to what now is named the contemporary social capital of the 
Nordic model (Veggeland 2007).  
 The aforementioned term of ‘Nordic flexicurity policy’ represents 
contextually collective action and a long-term social capital embracing both 
economic and social aspects. The driving force is a path-dependent political 
will to sustain a national partnership between the regulatory authorities, the 
unions of employees and the employers, and the people. The goal is good 
governance in the forms of universal social security, institutional stability, 
and economic and competitive advantages. Universal social security lays the 
foundation for the development of flexible labour markets that all the 
partners benefit from in different ways, including benefits irreducible to 
economic factors. 
 The Nordic Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) is another 
expensive public and private contribution to the social capital of the grand 
partnership and the flexicurity concept. ALMP is an important part of the 
state authorities’ responsibility for planning, building, restoring, and 
protecting human capital, and for making human resources the basic element 
of partnerships and social-capital building. ALMPs compel by regulatory 
innovations a range of public means and measures in order to function 
together, and the execution of these means and measures must take place 
within the framework of the universal welfare-state model. The mechanisms 
behind the Nordic flexicurity are as follows:   
• Universal welfare and social security allow employees to feel free to 
move and change job and partners – safety and equal access to welfare rule 
independently of geography, position, employer, and network attachment. 
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• ALMP performs collaborative governance by complex public-private 
partnership policies (social capital) and by education, individual training, and 
life-long learning (human capital). The performance involves not only the 
public sector but also partners across all sectors – from public services to 
private actors to NGOs.  
• Nordic flexicurity is a nationally implemented policy concept but is 
basic for partnership-building and domestic regional development capacities 
and across borders. Flexicurity reproduces long-term partnership 
arrangements, an effective labour market, high labour productivity, high 
employment rate, and a high level of social and human capital. 
 All together Nordic flexicurity as an important part of the social 
capital concept is indeed expensive and imposes a high tax burden on the 
citizens, but even so the policy sustains its legitimacy out of its double 
efficiency with regard to returning economic revenues and social security. 
Comparative figures suggestive of the OECD data were made available in 
the 2004 World Economic Forum report on the Lisbon Agenda. In a 
European perspective, these figures reveal that if the Anglo-Saxon USA 
were, for comparative purposes, an EU member state, it would rank fourth 
behind three existing member states on an overall assessment of economic 
competitiveness. Remarkably, the top countries – Denmark, Sweden, Finland 
and Norway – were all Nordic states. 
 The consistent performance of the Nordic social capital is striking 
across a range of indicators (Veggeland ed. 2016):  
• Economic growth;  
• Labour productivity; 
• Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP); 
• Labour-market flexibility but social security, called ‘flexicurity’;  
• Regional and local development policy; 
• Research and development investment;  
• Performance in the high-tech and telecom sectors;  
• Rates of employment (including among women and older workers). 
 In this context, social capital as flexicurity turns out to be not only 
‘capital’ but also ‘social’. Szreter and Woolcock (2004) were indeed right in 
their statement about Sweden; countries in the region ‘(provide) greater 
social capital to its citizens than do other countries’. 
 
The threat of non-maintenance 
 Basically, social-capital building may promote good governance and 
long-term positive consequences in one polity context, but in another context 
it may turn out very differently. From the analysis of this paper, we learn that 
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social models and administrative tradition do influence the quality and 
practical outcome of partnership formations. 
 Professor Vicente Navarro of Johns Hopkins University asks (2004: 
2) in a critical commentary: ‘Is capital the solution or the problem’? In a 
response to Theodore Lowi’s statement, his answer is that dominant neo-
liberal discourse in social science as a consequence of the 1980s, we have 
seen the appearance of concepts such as social capital and human capital. He 
writes:  
  ‘This dominance by an economic discourse was herald as an 
indicator of the supposed triumph of capitalism – which had closed any 
debate about the type of society and economic system we might want and 
refocused the debate on how to manage the only system we have. 
Consequently, the purpose of all social actions is reduced to accumulation of 
capital so that the individual can compete better. The capital might be 
physical, monetary, human, or social, but it is capital nevertheless’. 
 Thus, as ‘social capital’ has become an economic term in the era of 
neo-liberalism, it seems that flexicurity likewise is being threatened by the 
same shift of connotation away from a policy for national collective action. 
In the political debate, even in the Nordic countries, the economic 
connotation is given superiority as a policy for increasing European and 
national competitiveness and economic growth rather than for keeping the 
policy as a steady path to good welfare policy in the global age. The 
flexicurity policy faces serious challenges today by the embracing of labour 
immigration from Europe and other, more remote regions. The focus tends to 
change from the social connotation to the economic. The Nordic model is in 
drift; the maintenance of path-dependence is threatened (Taylor-Gooby (ed.) 
2004, Veggeland 2004, 2007, Tranøy 2006, Timonen 2004, Olsen 2005). 
 
Short conclusion 
 Flexicurity policy as social-capital building should remain a path for 
collective action and for solidarity, for reasons of democracy, social security 
and welfare, and for keeping the labour market flexible. As academics, we 
are not really responsible for policy performance, but we do have another 
responsibility. We are responsible for the definition of the terms and thereby 
the language in use. With reference to Navarro’s statement above, there is a 
need in social science today to break the trend that supports the dominance 
of economic language and the considerable reductionism and myopia this 
dominance generates. 
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